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,AND MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON PROGRESS

INTRODUCTION

It is currently in vogue in
some circles to claim that
Darwinian evolution violates a
law of decreasing order in the
universe, and therefore cannot
have occurred (see Patterson
1983). Proponents of this view
define evolution as progressive
change from simple to complex.
Ironically, their view of the
universe demands unidirectional
change--in this case, degeneration--far more than Darwinism
demands progressive improvement. In fact, the argument that
evolution means progress from
simple to complex is a straw
man in a neo-Darwinian context.
So it is odd to see an antievolutionary argument, however
weak in its own right, trying to
knock it down. The antievolutionists' definition of
evolution belongs to the
nineteenth century. But not,
significantly, to Charles Darwin.
This definition of evolution
is largely Spencerian. Darwin's
contemporary Herbert Spencer
did indeed view evolution as
progress from simple to
complex. He also claimed to
have anticipated Darwin in the

discovery of natural selection.
He too had been reading
Malthus; he too had derived
from Malthus a principle of
selection based on competition.
But in reality, Spencer's
selection differed from that of
Darwin, as did his vision of
evolutionary progress. In fact,
ornithologist and evolutionary
historian Ernst Mayr, in his
treatise on the history of
evolutionary biology, refused to
admit any role for Spencer in
the development of evolutionary
biology (Mayr 1982). To Mayr,
Spencer was merely a contemporary of Darwin who had
misconstrued biology in general
and misapplied Darwinism in
particular to social evolutionary
change. H e was also a man who
had received undue praise for
his contributions t o evolutionary
biology during his own lifetime
(for example, Buckley 1892).
Yet even before his death in
1903 Spencer's reputation had
considerably declined.
Evolutionary biology was no
longer Spencerian. In large
part, Mayr insists, it never was.
This negative appraisal of
Spencer's impact on
evolutionary biology is not

shared by a number of social historians (e.g., Bury
1932; Harris 1968, 1974; Carneiro 1967, 1974; and
Nisbet 1980), who accept Spencer's own assessment
of his impact on evolutionary theory (see especially
Harris 1968:123-128). Spencer's most ardent
defenders grant him, in addition, a better grasp
than Darwin himself of the bearing of "Darwinian"
principles of evolutionary progress on the nature of
general evolutionary change. Obviously, they
accept Spencer's definition of evolution as
progressive change from simple to complex. So the
straw-man argument of anti-evolutionists is not
entirely of their own manufacture. It is a fact,
however, that defining evolution as progressive
change would strike most modern evolutionary
biologists as misleading and simplistic.
In his autobiography, Spencer (1904) declared
that he had formulated the theory of natural
selection in an essay published in 1852, seven years
before Darwin's Origin appeared. True, he
acknowledged that in restricting his arguments to
human populations he had failed to operationalize
selection as a mechanism that could explain the
origin of all species. But he deemed his argument
conceptually similar to Darwin's, and he made his
case sufficiently convincing to others so that he
succeeded in gaining wide acceptance for it, even
today--although not among biologists.
There is a marked disparity between the view,
held by many biologists, that Spencer contributed
little to the development of Darwinian evolutionary
theory and the view, held by some social historians,
that Spencer was a central figure in its development, At the core of these disparate evaluations
are very different perceptions of Darwin's own
contribution to evolutionary theory. One cannot
fully understand Spencer's fall from grace in
biological circles unless one understands twentieth
century concepts of evolutionary progress. It is in
his view of biological progress that Darwin
departed most dramatically from Spencer. Darwin's
vision departed from that of Spencer in a manner
that foreshadowed twentieth century neo-Darwinian
ambivalence toward the notion of general progress
itself.
SPENCER'S PROGRESS

Herbert Spencer was an evolutionary progressionist. Underlying his vision of evolutionary
progress was a defense of individualism that was to
emerge, under the label Social Darwinism, most
clearly in the laissez-faire economics of the 1880s.
Spencer opposed all forms of socialism as
unwarranted political interference with individual

freedom. His grandiose theory of social evolution
posited that the "right," or most "fit," people would
survive and that order and perfection would be
achieved through natural evolution.
Spencer's idea of fitness was imbued with
nineteenth century notions of desirability and value,
and it is impossible to read Spencer today without
noticing the extent to which social prejudices
affected his interpretation of progress. Eggs-the
sex cells produced by women--could not play any
role in the coordination of development; development must be directed instead by sperm, which
must therefore figure more prominently in
evolutionary progress! Australian aborigines must
have body proportions that are less advanced--less
'heterogeneous"--than those of Europeans! One
biographer commented that we now approach
Spencer as we might approach an "outmoded
encyclopedia, ...not expecting to find what is right,
but rather to review errors that were plausible a
century ago" (Kennedy 1978:7). It was, however,
precisely those errors that made him so attractive
to his elite European contemporaries. H e told
them what they wanted to hear; he built a dream--a
Victorian gentleman's vision of the best of all
possible worlds. And then he assured his readers
that this dream had to come true. In fact, his
Utopia was very like that constructed by antievolutionists, except that the latter insist that God
must intervene, and Spencer insisted that progress
was guaranteed by natural law.
From early in his career, Spencer defended the
inevitability of progress. Common features of
diverse manifestations of progress must describe a
law that could be used to predict the future. Since
perfection, as Spencer imagined it, was not manifest
in his own world, all of the steps leading to
perfection could not have occurred yet. They
would in time, however, for "progress is not an
accident, not a thing within human control, but a
beneficent necessity" (191060).
In an essay called "Progress: Its Law and
Cause," Spencer's general doctrine of evolution
made its first appearance. The concept of selection
was not discussed in it, although this essay was
published five years after Spencer had first
introduced selection as a proximate cause of
progress. Indeed, biological evolution was of little
concern in this essay. It merely provided one, not
terribly strong, example of progressive evolution.
Evolution comprised all change from simple to
complex--all progress, in other words. Progress
could be manifested in any of numerous forms: in
the development of an individual; in the geological
development of the earth; in the history of society,
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government, manufacture, commerce, language,
literature, science, and art; and in the fossil record
of biological life. Spencer sought a law that would
guarantee the ultimate attainment of human
happiness, and he thought he found it in von Baer's
"law" of ontogenetic development. Organic
progress comprised change from "homogeneous to
heterogeneous," from simple to complex, from the
uniform germ cell to the differentiated adult
organism. "From the earliest traceable cosmical
changes down to the latest results of civilization,"
Spencer wrote, "we shall find that the
transformation of the homogeneous into the
heterogeneous, is that in which progress essentially
consists" (Spencer 1910:lO).
Once Spencer had formulated his law of all
development, he needed to find a principle that
would produce heterogeneity from homogeneity.
since progress or evolution comprised more than
biological transformation, this principle could not
be strictly biological. Furthermore, since it was
widely held in the nineteenth century that general
laws of development could be found that applied
across all disciplines, there was no need to
construct a biological explanation for biological
change. This is why Spencer invoked physical
forces to explain evolutionary change, and this is
one of the reasons why natural selection was
always, to Spencer, a secondary cause of
evolutionary change. Spencer argued that
increasing complexity was the necessary
consequence of active forces, their persistence and
cumulative effects. Thus, he believed, trees develop
from seeds, animals develop from fertilized ova,
and European limb proportions develop from those
of Australian aborigines, all because of "disturbing
forces." Biological modifications are brought about
by "mechanical conditions" or "muscular forces."
Such modifications are transmitted to offspring
through the inheritance of acquired characteristics-a notion compatible with the idea that the
cumulative effects of force must persist.
Today this seems a naive and superficial
argument, especially in light of the specific
examples this law was supposed to explain. (Do
"forces actingn really predict that Australian
aborigines will have "less heterogeneous" body
proportions--whatever that means--than
Europeans?) But to Spencer, both the
generalization that all progress consists of the
transformation of the simple into the complex and
the explanation that this is due to the persistence
of force were central truths. From physical
principles--the "indestructibility of matter," the
"continuity of motion," the "integration of matter,"

and the "dissipation of motionn--Spencer attempted
to derive all laws of change, and, in so doing, to
prove the inevitability of human perfection.
Thus a set of physical principles became
Spencer's First Principles (1862); they predicted
universal parallel transformations. When, during
Spencer's lifetime, it became evident that germ cells
are not homogeneous in structure and chemical
composition, he was nevertheless reluctant to
relinquish his law of universal development. This
concept was the key to his First Principles--and it
was from laws of the highest order of generality
that he derived all other generalities. The doctrine
of universal transformation was part and parcel
with Spencer's definition of evolution. Matter
tends to become integrated, Spencer wrote; motion
to become dissipated. Put matter and motion
together and you get greater coherence of
individual parts, and more parts. Using such
arguments Spencer could make the division of
labor in society comparable to the multiplication of
cells in an individual organism, or to the
diversification of all biological life (each involved
more "individual" parts). H e wrote:
Evolution is an integration of matter and
concomitant dissipation of motion; during
which the matter passes from a relatively
indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a
relative definite, coherent heterogeneity,
and during which the retained motion
undergoes a parallel transformation [cited
in Elliot 1970:244].
This definition of evolution is decidedly
nonbiological. In Spencer's world, biological
evolution was but one manifestation of a broader
process of change. And selection was but one
process that would aid the development of life on
earth. Darwin constructed a theory of change by
natural selection, according to which general
progress was one possible consequence; Spencer
constructed a theory of progress according to which
selection, and indeed, biological evolution, were
possible consequences.
SPENCER'S SELECTION

Use inheritance, Spencer's preferred mechanism
of biological evolutionary change, was rejected by
most biologists after the publication of Weismann's
germ theory in 1883. Darwin had accepted use
inheritance, although he defended natural selection
as the primary mechanism of evolutionary change.
Spencer, on the other hand, was never an ardent

defender of natural selection; and after the
publication of Weismann's germ theory threatened
to destroy the foundation of his own preferred
mechanism of evolutionary change, he intensified
his critique of selection and elevated use
inheritance to a primacy that even he had not
advocated before (Kennedy 1978). Only late in his
life did Spencer claim priority for having discovered
natural selection in human populations, and only
then did he lament having overlooked the "obvious
corollary" that selection must be a "universallyoperative factor in the development of [all] species"
(1904:451):
It seems strange that, having long
entertained a belief in the development of
species through the operation of natural
causes, I should have failed to see that the
truth [I] indicated [in some passages of
"Theory of Population"]...must hold, not of
mankind only, but of all animals; and must
everywhere be working changes among
them. If when human beings are subjected
by pressure of population to a competition
for the means of subsistence, it results that
on the average the tendency is for the select
of their generation to survive, so, little by
little, producing a better-adapted type; then
the like must happen with every other kind
of living thing similarly subjected to the
"struggle for existence." And if so, this
must in all cases cause a modification
[Spencer l904:4511.
The passage from "ATheory of Population,
Deduced from the General Law of Animal
Fertility" that, Spencer said, described natural
selection reads as follows:
The effect of pressure of population, in
increasing the ability to maintain life, and
decreasing the ability to multiply, is not a
uniform effect, but an average one....All
mankind in turn subject themselves more or
less to the discipline described; they either
may or may not advance under it; but, in
the nature of things, only those that do
advance under it eventually survive....
Families and races whom this increasing
difficulty of getting a living which excess of
fertility entails, does not stimulate to
improvements in production--that is, to
greater mental activity--are on the high
road to extinction; and must ultimately be
supplanted by those whom the pressure
does so stimulate....And here, indeed,

without further illustration, it will be seen
that premature death under all its forms,
and from all its causes, cannot fail to work
in the same direction. For as those
prematurely carried off must, in the average
of cases, be those in whom the power of
self-preservation is the least, it unavoidably
follows that those left behind to continue
the race, are those in whom the power of
self-preservation is the greatest--are the
select of their generation [Spencer
1852:266-2671.
"Theory of Population" was one of several early
Spencerian statements about the nature of progress.
It concerned the implications for human progress
of the so-called law of animal fertility. But rather
than failing to generalize or to consider organisms
in general, this essay begins'with the simplest
organisms and attempts to generalize to humans.
Darwin's theory of natural selection is not there,
not because of an oversight, not because the focus
was too narrow, not because Spencer believed the
inheritance of acquired characteristics sufficient to
explain organic evolution; but because, conceptually, Spencer's selection was different from that of
Darwin. It would be impossible to derive
Darwinian selection from it.
That is not to say that there are no similarities
between Darwin's concept of natural selection and
the selection Spencer described in "Theory of
Population." Both Darwin and Spencer developed
a principle of selection based on Malthus. Both
were members of a community of scholars writing
about the so-called population problem--Malthus's
supreme dilemma and "justification" for social
injustice (Chase 1980). The phrases struggle for life,
self-preservation, competition, and overproduction
were not concerns of Darwin alone, but of an
entire academic world to which both Darwin and
Spencer belonged. Like Darwin, Spencer used
competition and overproduction to make an
argument for rather than against evolutionary
change. Both Spencer and Darwin reversed the
prevailing view that the struggle for life preserved
the integrity of species by eliminating the unfit
(contrast Darwin and Spencer with William Kirby,
John Crawfurd, and, indeed, Malthus himself; see
Jones 1980).' But the similarities between
Spencer's and Darwin's original formulations of
selection end here.
Spencer's law of animal fertility was, like many
other Spencerian laws, a loose empirical
generalization based on a limited and carefully
selected sample of observations. Specifically, it was
based on the observation that simple organisms,
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such as bacteria, reproduce very rapidly and in
great quantities but produce short-lived offspring;
whereas more complex organisms, such as mammals, tend to produce few offspring, each of which
has greatly enhanced powers of self-preservation
and therefore greatly enhanced chances of surviving
for a long period of time. From this Spencer
derived a law that he took as characterizing the
Great Chain of Being-that there is an inherent
necessary opposition between individuation (that is,
self-preservation, complexity, coordination, capacity
for self-regulation) and reproduction (that is,
fertility). In order to advance along the ladder of
life, Spencer thought, there must be some sacrifice
in the realm of reproduction. Thus, Spencer
believed that it was not possible to advance in the
realm of individuation without simultaneously
experiencing a decline in fertility. (A similar
though not identical argument was offered in his
Principles of Biology, Vol. 11, 1867.)
Spencer liberally applied his law to a variety of
biological and social phenomena. For example,
sperm cells provided Spencer with one arena for a
battle between individuation and reproduction.
Since, Spencer thought, eggs could contain only
material "to be coordinated," sperm must be
responsible for coordinating the growth of the
nervous system and thus must possess remarkable
powers of individuation. Such powers could be
enhanced only at the expense of reproduction--that
is, decreased production of sperm cells. Spencer
argued that in sustaining this natural antagonism
between reproduction and individuation, sperm
cells must strike a delicate balance, sacrificing
fertility for greater efficiency in individuation.
Another application of the law of animal
fertility was to the problem of perfection in human
social and economic life. It was in this section of
his essay that Spencer erected selection as a
proximate cause of progress.
Spencer argued here that humans had not yet
achieved ultimate perfection since human
populations were still plagued by excess fertility.
As long as excess fertility existed, there was room
for its reduction; and as long as there was room for
reduced fertility, increased individuation could
occur. It was in this sense that Spencer posited
excess fertility as a problem for human populations,
and it was in this sense that he viewed population
pressure as a "proximate cause of progress" (or of
individuation). Stated in this way, Spencer's early
formulation of selection looks very non-Darwinian,
and also very nineteenth century. And as might be
anticipated, Spencer envisioned that this increased
individuation would be manifested in human

anatomy as well as in social behavior.
The argument went like this: Population
pressure poses a problem whose solution necessitates technological or industrial advance--that is,
improvements in the skills of self-preservation.
One improves one's own and one's family's chance
of survival (self-preservation) by increasing
industrial or agricultural production (most definitely not by increasing fertility). Premature death
comes to those who fail to contend in this way with
the problem of population pressure. Thus, the
proximate cause of progress is excess fertility.
Given excess fertility, there is necessarily competition, and given competition, there is necessarily
improvement in skill by selection. Those males "in
whom the power of self-preservation is the greatest"
will be "the select of their generation." In other
words, they will exhibit a prescribed and predictable
set of improvements--prescribed and predictable
not because selection is operating under specific
environmental conditions, but because of a law that
requires all improvement to be unidirectional.
It was only after Spencer had described all of
the presumed manifestations and ramifications of
individuation that he felt ready to predict future
change. The "select of their generation" would
have bigger brains, would have heightened senses of
morality, and would be less fertile than those in
whom the "power of self-preservation" was the
least. "So long as there is pressure on the means of
subsistence," Spencer wrote (1852:267), "further
mental development must go on, and further
diminution of fertility must result."
This rather startling conclusion is but a short
step from the next, and perhaps least Darwinian, of
Spencer's deductions--that selection generated by
population pressure or the struggle for life would
be the vehicle of its own eradication. Selection, as
originally formulated by Herbert Spencer, was a
self-destructive process!
Spencer reasoned that intellectual, moral, and
physical improvement could not accrue forever, just
as fertility cannot decrease ad infiniturn, since such
a decrease would threaten the extinction of the
population. But according to Spencer's law, without a concomitant decrease in fertility there could
be no progress in the realm of individuation. "For
a cessation in the decrease of fertility implies a
cessation in the development of the nervous
system." Spencer did not see this as a problem,
however, since
this implies that the nervous system has
become fully equal to all that is demanded
of it--has not to do more than is natural to

it....In the end the obtainment of
subsistence will require just that kind and
that amount of action needful to perfect
health and happiness [Spencer 1852:267].
Spencer believed that, once the human
population produced only enough offspring to
sustain itself, Utopia would have emerged. There
would be no further suffering, no further evil.
Virtually no youth would succumb to disease or to
accident, and the powers of self-preservation of
those born into this world would be as perfect as
possible. The population would have increased to
the maximum possible to comfortably people the
globe. Inferior, lazy races would have disappeared,
and no further evolution would be possible. Here
was the making of the perfect human type--one that
satisfied the prejudices of the Victorian world.
Interestingly, Spencer's conclusion that
decreased fertility would solve Malthus's population
problem was not unique. Indeed, as Nisbet (1980)
has shown, Malthus himself had come to this
conclusion in late versions of his famous essay.
Perhaps Spencer's most striking distinction was that
he couched his argument in terms of a biological
Iaw--of necessity rather than opportunity. This was
in part why Spencer was so esteemed in the
nineteenth century, when every scholar's goal was
to discover those few laws from which, presumably,
everything could be logically derived. But it did
not make Spencer's essay strikingly Darwinian;
Darwin did not hang selection on a law of
necessary antagonism between individuation and
reproduction.
The wide acceptance of Spencer's argument of
scholarly priority is most curious, particular in light
of the proclivity of Darwinian biologists to equate
selection with differential reproduction and to
consider increases in fertility and fecundity
advantageous. Spencer's early concept of selection
was in some ways antithetical to Darwinian
selection as currently understood.
Of course Spencer's selection did involve
differential survival--the differential survival of
acquired traits. To Spencer, there was no question
that greater industriousness, larger brains, and less
inclination to reproduce, would be inherited. The
conscious choice to work hard in the face of
population pressure would effect behavioral and
physical changes that would be passed on through
use inheritance to offspring. Spencer never
considered it possible that people with many
offspring could be the "select of their generation."
The "select" must be disinclined toward the physical
act of reproduction itself. To the "select,"

pleasurable activities would be those of the mind.
In summary, when Spencer wrote that
population pressure is the cause of progress, he
meant, first, that it is the problem that humans
must strive to overcome; and second, that it is the
mechanical cause of a competitive struggle that
must result in differential survival. Difficulty in
getting a living stimulates improvements in
industrial and agricultural production. Individuals
strive toward self-preservation. Those who seek to
solve the population problem by improving their
own lot through hard work will succeed, and their
success will be manifested in biological changes that
are inherited. Their offspring will inherit larger
brains, greater skill, intelligence, self-regulation,
and self-satisfaction, as well as reduced fertility!
Spencer's selection was far more deterministic
than that which Darwin was to propose seven years
later. How could Spencer's selection explain
variation in human pigmentation or the shape of
the beak of finches? Spencer did not frame
selection as a vehicle of variable, adaptive change.
He had not merely failed to extend his concept
beyond humans; he had failed to apply it to human
adaptive diversity.
Even late in his lifetime, after he had
incorporated a more Darwinian concept of
selection into his work, Spencer clung to a vision of
unilinear progress. Selection was always a means
to achieve supreme order and stability in human
society. It was always a means toward perfecting
the human type.
To his credit, in his Autobiography, Spencer
(1904) acknowledged his failure to consider
adaptive variation; he realized that here lay the key
to Darwin's resolution of the population problem
and particular formulation of selection. The fact
remains, however, that in 1852, Spencer had not
devised a concept that could account for adaptive
diversity--human or otherwise. This was, of course,
Darwin's central concern in his Origin of Species.
DARWIN'S GENIUS

It may seem odd to say that one can recognize
genius in ambivalence. Yet skepticism is the stuff
of scientific advance, and it is all the more impressive when it challenges a belief that has become
entrenched in the scholarly literature. Such was
the belief in progress. When Darwin wrote The
Origin of Species, the belief in progress dominated
far more than the discipline of biology; it dominated all fields of natural, social, and physical science,
as well as the humanities. The second half of the
nineteenth century was the heyday of the idea of
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progress (Bury 1932; Nisbet 1980). Charles Darwin
was a product of that age. He was certainly an
evolutionary progressionist, but he was also one of
the most severe critics of the "law" of progressive
development. This is why Gould (1977:13) has
maintained that "an explicit denial of innate progression is the most characteristic feature
separating Darwin's theory of natural selection
from other nineteenth century evolutionary
theories." Darwin only weakly defended the best
accepted standards of overall advance in
organization. H e found problematic both von
Baer's criterion of increased complexity and Milne
Edwards's criterion of increased specialization in
function of organs.
The difficulty Darwin experienced in accepting
any single standard of progress in the biological
world stemmed from his acute sense that the pattern of diversification does not describe a simple
pattern of increase in any one thing, and also from
his awareness that the theory he had developed did
not require it. Natural selection was Darwin's
agent of progress; yet he had defined it in such a
way that progress could not be a necessary consequence. Natural selection was a mechanism whereby fitness--an organism's adaptation to a particular
environment-is enhanced. In other words, natural
selection was, to Darwin, an agent of local adaptation. Furthermore, although Darwin left the causes
of variation undefined, he was explicit in his belief
that natural selection must work with variation
produced by some process independent of selection
itself. If beneficial variants are not somehow a
priori produced; or if there is no modification in
the physical or biotic environment providing an
incentive (or pressure) for improvement; or, finally,
if certain existing complex adaptations are no
longer needed in a changed or newly occupied environment; then it follows that progress may not
occur. It is even possible that retrogression in the
scale of organization will occur. In a nutshell, if
different environments require different adaptations, Darwin's theory provided no clear standard
by which an organism from one environment could
be judged superior to an organism from another.
Indeed, it provided no clear standard by which they
could be compared. Darwin wrote:
We can see, bearing in mind that all
organic beings are striving to increase at a
high ratio and to seize on every unoccupied
or less well occupied place in the economy
of nature, that it is quite possible for
natural selection gradually to fit a being to
a situation in which several organs would

be superfluous or useless; in such cases
there would be retrogression in the scale of
organization [Darwin 1963: 1051.
Also:
On our theory the continued existence of
lowly forms offers no difficulty; for natural
selection, or the survival of the fittest, does
not necessarily include progressive
development--it only takes advantage of
such variations as arise and are beneficial to
each creature under its complex relations of
life [1963:105].
By asking how much the level of organization
had actually tended to advance, Darwin converted
the general truth of progress into a hypothesis
demanding more data for verification. H e acknowledged that his hypothesis that organization on the
whole should advance under natural selection had
not yet been adequately tested, and he admitted
practical difficulties in testing it. There were, for
example, difficulties in ranking "highn and "low"
when comparing biota from different areas or from
different times, or in comparing organisms exhibiting very different organizational plans. "Who will
decide," wrote Darwin (1963, p. 337), "whether a
cuttle fish be higher than a bee?" In their own
worlds, barnacles, parasites, and earthworms are as
perfect as are horses, falcons, and people. What's
more, Darwin marshalled evidence to show that
general progress had not, indeed, universally
occurred, and that the pattern of diversification
produced by natural selection was hard to interpret
in terms of a simple polarity between low and high
or simple and complex. Darwin went so far as to
say that if one insists that his theory demands that
progress must occur, one is then forced t o consider
his theory falsified! Progress (in the sense of
overall advance in organization) is a prediction, but
not a necessary consequence, of natural selection.
Perfection in a local context and overall advance in
organization are not the same thing. Under
specific environmental conditions, overall advance
in organization could not be expected to occur.
Darwin's theory was an optimization theory
based on context-specific competition. H e talked
about natural selection producing increasingly
complex organisms, or increasingly reproductively
successful organisms, or organisms with increasingly
bigger brains. But he left only one criterion for
judging overall fitness--competitive success within
specific environmental contexts. The metaphors he
used, including those he borrowed from Spencer

(most notably "survival of the fittest"), reflected his
concern for competitive success as the criterion
whereby fitness could be ranked. As modern nonDarwinian biologists are quick to point out (for
example, Ho and Saunders 1979), ordering by
fitness, thus conceived, breaks down whenever
competition cannot be an issue. Suppose, for
instance, that a species moves into a new niche or a
new environment in order to avoid competition,
and that this move is the basis of a new success.
When two organisms do not compete it is difficult
if not impossible to evaluate their relative fitness.
Of course, species are also affected by the
abiotic conditions of life. If an organism is known
to do poorly in a particular environment, it can be
said to be poorly adapted to that environment,
whether or not other species with which it might
compete are present. Any assessment of relative
fitness depends on the specific abiotic as well as
biotic environment. A species that has a clear
competitive advantage over another species may
lose that advantage completely in a different
environment. It follows that no single quantity
increases as a result of natural selection, and that
one cannot even apply Darwin's theory to make
predictions of relative advantage without first
specifying a complex set of conditions to which the
organisms must adapt (see Maynard Smith 1978;
Bock 1979).
So Darwin's theory allows one to define and
predict relative fitness under specific local
conditions, but not to define fitness in a global
sense as a quantity tending to increase during
evolution. It is possible that there simply is no one
quantity that increases in such a manner--at least
not as a consequence of Darwin's mechanism of
natural selection. Still, based on the premise that
modern organisms have beaten their predecessors
in the game of survival, and on the assumption that
time's arrow will be reflected in improvements
representing the cumulative effects of competition,
numerous scholars have tried to define such a
quantity. The results have been equivocal, as we
shall see.
What is remarkable about Darwin is that he
was willing to defend evolution without
simultaneously defending a progress-dependent
vectorial view of the universe. The reluctance of
many modern biologists to define evolution as
anything more than constant adjustment of lineages
to changing environmental conditions, their
unwillingness to recognize more than net progress
of different sorts in different evolutionary lineages,
and their general refusal to equate evolution with
progress of any sort, are direct consequences of the
Darwinian paradigm. Modern neo-Darwinists do

not depart radically from Darwin's ambivalence
toward the concept of overall evolutionary progress.
MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF PROGRESS:
NEO-DARWINISM

Progress does not have a single interpretation
in the neo-Darwinian paradigm. Most neoDarwinists agree that there is no standard by which
uniform progress can be said to have taken place
(Simpson 1974; Ayala 1974, 1977). Evolution is
too erratic. But neo-Darwinists also believe that
net progress has occurred, and that progress can
only be understood in a Darwinian context.
Progress is not possible without selection, although
selection does not necessarily result in progress.
Selection, while not directed, gives direction to
evolution. That direction results either in
adjustment to local conditions (perfection only in
the sense of better local adaptation), or in
improved capacity to compete under a variety of
circumstances (perfection in a more general sense).
Directional evolution is said to occur without
progress if, despite long sustained directional
change, terminal members of a lineage are not
"better off in some general sense than early
members of the same lineage. Spatial clines may
exhibit adaptive fine-tuning whereby individuals at
opposite ends of a geographic range are adapted to
entirely different environments, but individuals at
neither end are more progressive than the others.
Similarly, temporal gradients may exhibit the
same kind of directional change without general
improvement. General progress is said to occur
when later members of a lineage acquire true
improvements. There have been repeated attempts
to find simple quantities that may improve in such
a manner as a result of natural selection. Such a
quantity may be defined as a function of
optimization processes or as a consequence of longterm competition. Fitness will be optimized during
natural selection; therefore, one has to discover the
properties of greater fitness. What has emerged is
a multifocal definition of general progress. There
are many standards of progress, and all of them are
believed to accrue as a function of natural
selection. Competition will result in broader
ranges of adaptive response to adversity; it will
result in increased homeostasis, improved potential
for reproductive success, increased complexity,
increased efficiency in the utilization of limited
resources, and so on. Even adaptive diversification
has been attributed to natural selection (although
clearly other factors are also involved, at least in
the multiplication of lineages).
What has also emerged in the neo-Darwinian
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literature is the sense that none of these standards
is entirely satisfactory as a criterion for general
progress, because increases in a given direction will
not always give species a competitive advantage.
Take, for example, increases in the range of
adaptive response. Generalists display adaptive
flexibility; yet when resource diversity is low, a
generalist adaptive strategy is not successful-specialists are better able to utilize the ubiquitous,
if monotonous, available foods. Similarly,
complexity is not always beneficial. Simple
parasites do quite well by taking advantage of the
vital life services provided by their hosts. Greater
metabolic efficiency may not be a good standard
under all conditions; one can easily envision
circumstances under which new metabolically
expensive adaptations will be selected in order to
attain some other advantage. It seems that even
general criteria of progress cannot be applied
universally. Modern Darwinism recognizes, just as
Darwin did, that the theory of natural selection
implicitly prohibits a single best criterion for
progressive change from being formulated.
Standards of progress appear ad hoc or axiological.
George Gaylord Simpson has stated this
eloquently, concluding a review article entitled "The
Concept of Progress in Organic Evolution" with the
following observations:
Some organisms are better than their
ancestors or than some of their relatives at
doing certain things in certain ways. Some
oysters are better at being oysters than their
ancestors. Some trees are better at living
on.mountain tops than others. We are
doubtless better at being men than
Australopithecus was, although I go along
with Haldane far enough to believe that
monkeys are better at being monkeys than
we would be even if we tried. It is also true
that sometimes whole groups have been
carried by selection to a point where their
great expansion into various adaptive zones
became possible, a progressive feature of
evolution ....That is the explanation, in
unduly broad terms, of the spread of
dominant groups from time to time.
With such examples it is perfectly reasonable to say that improvement has
factually occurred and that there is
therefore evolutionary progress. The
progress is, however, ad hoc in every case.
Our ancestors' progress was not the
oysters', the trees', or the monkeys', nor was
theirs ours. Since we are humans, after all,

the most interesting and important progress
is progress toward us, but let us not
mistake this for a general phenomenon.
Probably the most important result of
this somewhat dispersive inquiry is negative:
there is no innate tendency toward
evolutionary progress and no one, overall
sort of such progress. We cannot sit back
and assume that natural selection will lead
to progress for us, or for anything else. We
cannot even assume that prolongation of
past progress would continue to be progress
[Simpson 197450-511.
Francisco Ayala (1977516) draws a similar conclusion: "Organisms are more or less progressive
depending on what criterion of progress is used.
By certain criteria, flowering plants are more progressive than many animals." Homo is only the
"most perfect" of organisms 'if one chooses one's
standard of progress accordingly. But such a standard as "the ability to perceive the environment,
and to integrate, coordinate and react flexibly to
what is perceived ...is not necessarily better or worse
than other criteria of progress" (Ayala 1977516).
So progress is ambiguous in a neo-Darwinian
context, and neo-Darwinism simultaneously claims
and disavows it. Neo-Darwinists certainly do not
equate progress with evolution, as some antievolutionists have claimed. Even if we could find
some one quantity that increases with time as a
result of natural selection, we would have to assess
the relative importance of that increase as opposed
to other kinds of evolutionary change before evolution could be equated in any sense with progressive
change.
Recently the adequacy of neo-Darwinism to
explain different forms of progress has been
challenged on other grounds. Progress has not only
diverse meanings, but also diverse causal
mechanisms.
MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF PROGRESS:
NON-DARWINIAN FRAMEWORKS

Perhaps the least radical of the challenges
comes from proponents of the theory of punctuated
equilibria (Eldredge and Gould 1972; Stanley 1975,
1979; Gould and Eldredge 1977; Gould 1980;
Eldredge 1985a,b). Their argument is less a
challenge to the importance of Darwinian selection
as a driver of evolutionary trends than it is a
challenge to the primacy of the narrower neoDarwinian reformulation of selection--that is,
"natural selection" as mathematized and

conceptualized by the founders of the "Modern
Synthesis." The "Modern Synthesis" refers to the
melding of Darwinism and particulate ("beanbag")
genetics2 that occurred in the 1930s largely through
the efforts of geneticists such as Haldane, Fisher,
Wright, and Dobzhansky (see Fisher 1930;
Dobzhansky 1937; Mayr 1942).
The growth and acceptance of beanbag genetics
gave new meaning to natural selection and to
evolution in general; evolution was now temporal
change in gene frequency, brought about through
the differential survival and reproduction of
individuals belonging to single species. Selection
operating at higher levels (for example, among
breeding populations or whole species) was deemed
unimportant, despite the fact that Darwin had
considered competition at multiple levels very
much a part of the normal operation of natural
selection. The neo-Darwinian focus on individuals
developed not directly from Darwin's work but
from the synthesis of Darwinian naturalism and
population genetics. Neo-Darwinism was a theory
of genes which tied the ultimate survival of genes
to the differential survival of their individual hosts.
By the 1970s, sociobiologists--perhaps the
staunchest, least compromising of modern
defenders of neo-Darwinism-had begun criticizing
the Synthesis for not taking gene theory far enough.
To sociobiologists, selection acts at the level of
'selfish," competitive genes and can in fact thwart
the selfish interests of the individuals carrying them
(viz., the evolution of all forms of altruism, which
sociobiologists take to be genetically controlled;
Wilson 1975; Dawkins 1976, 1986).
Of course, one need not resort to beanbag
genetics to justify, within a Darwinian paradigm, an
emphasis on differential survival of individuals
(rather than of populations or species). If
competition is the fundamental component of
natural selection operating at any level, then in
order to discover the level at which natural
selection most frequently operates we might ask
where we would expect to find the most severe
competition. The intensity of the "struggle for
existence" should depend on the similarity of the
competing individuals as well as the extent of their
overlapping requirements. Because members of the
same genus tend to resemble each other more than
do members of different genera, congeneric
competition should be greater than competition
between species of different genera. Competition
between individual members of the same species
should be the most severe.
But proponents of the theory of punctuated
equilibria argue, contra neo-Darwinism and

sociobiology, that long-term macroevolutionary
trends are less a product of the differential success
of individuals belonging to single species than of
differential production and success of whole
species. They claim that competition between
individuals within species, at least during the vast
majority of the existence of most species, will lead
to fine adaptive adjustments but rarely to long-term
directional trends of the sort that may be identified
as progressive (Gould 1980; Stanley 1981; Eldredge
1985a, 1985b, 1989).
Punctuationalists base this claim on the
postulate that rapid phenotypic evolution most
often occurs under conditions that are also,
incidentally, conducive to the generation of new
lineages (for recent discussions, pro and con, see
Eldredge 1985b, 1989; Vrba 1985; Hoffman 1989;
Levinton 1989; Otte and Endler 1989; Godfrey and
Marks 1991; Kimbel and Martin 1993). Speciation
(the multiplication of lineages) generally occurs
because small populations have become
geographically isolated and genetically separated
(e.g., due to karyotypic changes that initiate
reproductive isolation) from their parent
populations (White 1978; Godfrey and Marks
1991). Furthermore, small populations facilitate
the fixation and spread of evolutionary novelties
generated not solely by selection but also by
stochastic processes.
Thus, punctuationalists argue, it is the process
of speciation per se, and not the intensity of
competition between individuals, that produces
rapid morphological evolution. Indeed, it has been
suggested that periods of relaxed (rather than
intense) competition may occur in association with
speciation, and that such relaxed selection may
allow the survival of novelties that would not
otherwise survive. Finally, punctuationalists argue
that if the factors affecting evolutionary change
during speciation differ from the factors affecting
evolutionary change in whole lineages, we cannot
predict evolutionary trends as products of the
constant adjustment of individuals to their changing
environments. Speciation trends (that is, trends
associated with the differential production or
survival of species) may have little in common with
trends associated with the differential survival of
individuals belonging to single species (Stanley
1979). The relative competitive success of a species
may ultimately depend on events that occur in a
short period of time during its origination. This of
course throws wide open the question of whether
selection as used by neo-Darwinists drives
"progressive" evolution! It seems that, to sort this
out, we must build a hierarchical model of
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evolution, in which selection is free to act at
multiple levels and independent directional trends
can be produced at those different levels, with
concomitant upward and downward effects (Gould
1980; Vrba 1984; Vrba and Eldredge 1984;
Eldredge 1985a,b).
A more basic challenge to the tenets of neoDarwinism has come from evolutionists who reject
the notion that directional trends are the product
of selection operating at any level (see, for
example, Saunders and Ho 1976, 1981; Ho and
Saunders 1979, 1984; Katz, 1982, 1987). They
argue that classic examples of evolutionary progress
driven by selection (including increases in
complexity) can be understood without reference to
either optimization theory or competition. Instead
they offer a theory that examines the properties of
biological systems and the internal developmental
constraints on the direction of evolutionary change.
An optimization model that predicts merely that
"advantageous" changes will occur is, at the very
least, incomplete.
It is the poorly understood link between the
genome and the phenotype that so fascinates these
investigators. While neo-Darwinism has been
strongly influenced by population genetics, it has
remained relatively uninfluenced by experimental
embryology or physiological genetics (Raff and
Kaufman 1983; Arthur 1987). Yet phenotypes arise
only indirectly from genes; they arise through the
interactive process of development. What is often
missing from genetic models of phenotypic
evolution (and also from attempts to link particular
genetic or chromosomal structural changes to
radical morphological change) is the bridging
argument from physiological genetics (Godfrey and
Marks 1991; Marks 1992). Non-Darwinian
evolutionary biologists such as Mae-Wan Ho and
Peter Saunders have long maintained that biologists
cannot understand the pattern or directionality of
evolutionary change unless more attention is paid
to how epigenetic systems work (that is, the
interactions between the genome, the cellular
environment in which the genome operates, and the
external environment in which development of the
organism as a whole takes place). It is like trying
to predict patterns of change in computer programs
without understanding the language (the subroutines, built-in functions, and mathematical
identities) in which the programs are written
(Saunders and Ho 1981). If we want to understand
potential modifications of a computer program, Ho
and Saunders argue, it is far more useful to learn
the language than to build expectations based on a
naive optimization model. (See Katz 1982, 1987,

for an application to the problem of the evolution
of the human brain. For a radical exposition of
this evolutionary perspective, see Lima-de-Faria
1988.)
Non-Darwinian biologists insist that it is not
sufficient to view evolution as change in gene
frequency, or even as change in the genetic
blueprint for development. Such a paradigm, they
argue, fails to consider how directions of
evolutionary change are influenced by the structure
of the genome, genetic redundancy, and epigenetic
interactions. Using a Darwinian predictive
framework alone, one can imagine that changes in
all directions are generated by "random" mutations
and that the actual direction of change is limited
only by competitive advantage. Individual
competition is ubiquitous and sufficient to make
natural selection a constant viable force, generation
after generation. However, some field studies have
suggested that competition may not be as important
as Darwin and his contemporaries believed (for
example, Wiens 1983). Perhaps competition only
matters during resource crunches and selection
operates intermittently in populations in general.
Furthermore, it is abundantly clear that the
variations on which natural selection works are not
random. To the extent that they themselves are
patterned and predictable, they will impart some
directionality to evolutionary change (Ho and
Saunders 1979; Saunders and Ho 1981; Bonner
1982). Finally, there is the (alas! seemingly neoLamarckian) suggestion that cytoplasmic
inheritance may be involved, at least in the initial
stages of fixing new epigenetic pathways (Ho and
Saunders 1979; Saunders 1985). If so (and the
evidence for this is far from conclusive; Maynard
Smith 1982), we have yet another agent of
directional and progressive change (see Arthur
1984, 1987 for a discussion of the normal operation
of cytoplasmic inheritance).
So progress has changed considerably from its
nineteenth century Spencerian formulation. To
Spencer, progress was a law of all evolutionary
change--a law of increasing complexity that was also
strongly associated with "fitness for the conditions
of life" and with the attainment of the ideal type.
Natural selection was a consequence of progress,
although not its sole cause. To Darwin, progress
was a consequence of natural selection, although
not a necessary consequence. Neo-Darwinists treat
progress essentially as Darwin did, although it has
become more openly multifocal and, to some
leading neo-Darwinists, ad hoc. Some nonDarwinian evolutionists now argue that the notion
of increasing complexity must be divorced from the

notion of selection or fitness. Increases in
complexity, long believed to be a major indicator of
progressive or advantageous change, may follow
automatically from the way in which the epigenetic
system operates. Complexity is probably not best
conceived as a measure of fitness, but as a measure
of the information content of developmental
building instructions. It will not necessarily
increase as a function of optimization. Phenotypic
changes will not occur randomly, but will depend
on the existence of alternative developmental
pathways that can accommodate them. At issue is
the probability of the occurrence of changes in
different directions.
What has been called progress, then, is quite
probably the product of a host of factors, only one
of which is the natural selection of individuals
belonging to single lineages. And evolution is not
.merely progressive change!

genome. There are also long strings of "silent"
(non-coding) DNA both within and between genes.
These can evolve quickly because their molecular
structure can change without producing deleterious
consequences for the phenotype. Only
approximately 1% of the genome is coding. The
genome has promotors and binding sites that are
essential to the development and functioning of the
organism but are never transcribed; it is not clear
whether these should be called genes. Two
essential questions, the relationship between
'genes" and "characters," and the effects of the
structure of the genome on the production of
phenotypes, remain unsolved. Marks (1992)
reviews the demise of "beanbag" genetics, and how
advances in molecular genetics may affect
evolutionary theory.
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